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Is there a dynamic correspondence between the unfolding of media narratives 
about conflict and how that conflict plays out on the ground? In particular, 
can this question be applied productively to the Maluku wars, an outbreak 
of religious violence at the end of Indonesia’s long developmentalist epoch 
(1966-1998)? This paper argues that far from being disinterested purveyors of 
unproblematic truths, media workers are implicated in the creation and spread 
of ideas and images that shape the political discourses which exacerbate 
violent conflict. Its method is discourse analysis of a canon of journalism that 
reported the conflict in its first few years. Despite their papers’ diverse origins, 
news reporters from both metropolitan dailies under study – Kompas and 
Republika – employed storytelling conventions that produced ‘primordialist’ 
readings of this violence. This textual strategy on top of an analytic failure to 
track shifting power relations between political elites in Jakarta and Maluku 
did nothing to assist a negotiated peace and may have contributed to the war’s 
significant escalation.
“The best place from which to tell the story of a war is close to the action
but at some distance from the values.”
    - Jean Seaton, Carnage and the Media (2005)
Steve Sharp
James Cook University, Queensland, Australia           
steve.sharp@jcu.edu.au
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Communal war in Maluku’s chain of islands from early 1999 brought 
unprecedented devastation to Indonesia’s eastern periphery. A conflict whose 
inter-religious hostility was unique in Indonesian history began as crudely-armed 
young men attacking entire neighbourhoods, but soon it became apparent that 
many fatalities were the result of intervention by various units of the security 
forces. 
  
By July 2000, under a civil state of emergency, 14,000 troops were stationed across 
Maluku; however, their large numbers did not translate into reduced violence. 
By early 2001, in the capital Jakarta, President Abdurrahman Wahid’s position 
was becoming untenable, owing to fracturing within his own party and loss of 
confidence within the parliament. It was during this period of a waning presidency 
that security forces took their most decisive action against Islamic militants known 
as Laskar Jihad, having only 12 months earlier facilitated their passage to the 
region.
Ethno-religious hatred and war exploded at the end of the long developmentalist 
epoch, a period coinciding with the reign of President Suharto (1966-1998). When 
the first free national elections were held in June 1999, the conflict was well 
underway in the south (Ambon) but yet to erupt in North Maluku. That long period 
saw the Indonesian press transformed into one subservient to centralised state 
power, as all civil institutions were progressively re-made to serve state interests - 
defined in terms of national development and stability. 
The ideology which underpinned nation-building under Suharto was known 
as Pancasila (Five Principles) and the press industry which lacked autonomy 
from state control became known as the Pancasila press. Its transformation, 
however, was not without periodic bursts of fighting spirit, which attempted to 
open civil space to not only assert autonomy but also act as a counter-balance 
to state power. This resistance, most notably in 1974, 1978 and 1994 – on each 
occasion crushed by brute state force - drew on an older anti-colonial tradition 
with its origins in the birth of an indigenous press in the late nineteenth century. 
The tradition infused the nationalist movement in the twentieth century and 
underpinned its struggle (perjuangan) towards independence, declared at the 
end of the war in 1945 (Adam 1995: 176). The anti-authoritarian impulses, which 
nourished the press before and after the defeat of the Dutch colonial order helped 
forge a movement referred to as the perjuangan press.
The revival of this latter press movement in the 1990s was instrumental in 
hastening the collapse of Suharto’s New Order and fragmentation of its political 
forces after 1998. A number of important policy developments followed regime 
collapse: the granting of hundreds of new press licences after May 1998; the 
abolition of formal press licensing the following year; the end of mandatory 
membership of the state-sanctioned journalists’ union (PWI)1 and later (under 
Wahid) the dismantling of the Department of Information.
Background
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The end of dictatorship opened the way for a much pluralised political landscape 
with the freeing-up of political expression and association. Much of this 
initial expression was unrestrained; having endured more than thirty years of 
suppression, the groups to take advantage of the new atmosphere of political 
contestation included those bound by ethnic and religious identity and interests, 
including regional interests.
Within Indonesia’s unitary state, ethnicity and religion were seen as primordial 
identities and a permanent threat to the national culture, which was glorified over 
all other forms. The fact that Indonesia contained hundreds of ethnic groups and a 
complex history of religious politics was overlooked in favour of de-politicisation. 
Pancasila was a non-negotiable ideology backed by an all-powerful state that 
suppressed sub-national identities and beliefs precisely because New Order 
ideologues knew that such beliefs contained the seeds of political mobilization 
against the state. But these repressive policies only served to sharpen ethno-
religious identities, including in Maluku.
In general terms, communal conflict across the Maluku archipelago in 1999 
derived both from the rupture of pre-1998 arrangements between political 
elites in Jakarta and Maluku and the sudden opening of opportunities for 
political contestation over ‘communal goods’. Openings appeared when 
Suharto’s centralized patronage system started to break up – a system based, 
as it was, on the co-option of regional elites and enforced by a loyal military. 
As communal resources became ‘up-for-grabs’ and as national elections were 
looming in June 1999, elites in Maluku mobilized their grassroots supporters who 
organized themselves into militias drawn from the islands’ Christian and Muslim 
neighbourhoods and villages.
In Ambon, the war originated both from competition between Christian and 
Muslim Ambonese for political office and public service jobs and conflict between 
indigenous Christian Ambonese and assertive migrant traders from South 
Sulawesi of Islamic faith. In the north, it was a land dispute between (mainly 
Christian) indigenous Kao and Muslim settlers from Makian Island who were 
suspected of consolidating their control of the north Maluku district bureaucracy 
and positioning themselves to control revenue from a gold mine on Kao land. 
Critical in sustaining northern violence was the ongoing communal-religious 
competition to capture the machinery of government when a new province of 
North Maluku was created in September 1999.
Although the wars in the south (Ambon) and in the north (based on Halmahera 
Island and spreading to Ternate and Tidore) had different beginnings, once 
fighting became militarized, mobilization converged along religious lines. 
Representing the Maluku wars2 as a ‘national experience’ was always going to be 
sensitive because communal strife raised the spectre of national disintegration. 
Despite their newly won freedoms, the Indonesian press carried some heavy 
baggage. They were used to direct military-bureaucratic intervention, known in 
Reporting civil war
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professional circles as kebudayaan telpon (telephone culture) and the routine 
supply of graft (envelopes of cash) to reporters in return for attending and giving 
favourable coverage to government (and other) press conferences/events, known 
as kebudayaan amplop (envelope culture).
During the chaotic transition, democratic euphoria was tempered by emerging 
threats. The reformist movement known as reformasi – which the press helped 
bring into being – empowered communal groups tied to emerging political 
contenders. With political authority at the centre weakened by the collapse of 
the patronage system referred to above, and with security force loyalties divided, 
delivering numbers at street demonstrations became a tactic of choice for 
competing political interests.
For a profession that had hitherto accepted reporting communal conflict as taboo, 
these emerging pressure groups presented new dilemmas. As communal tension 
spilled over into violence in several regions across the republic, reporters were 
aware that their acts of reporting could have a direct consequence for “the raising 
and suppressing of community emotion” (Qodari 2000: 11). They were also aware 
that hostility could be turned against media organizations themselves.
Research by Gazali of regional press and radio reporters revealed a fear of ‘mob 
dictatorship’ in reaction to news content. He cites “at least five serious cases of 
a massive mob attack against a media office” occurred between July 1999 and 
February 2000 (2002: 136).3 Direct harassment and physical attacks on media 
workers had a corrosive influence and assumed greater importance as New Order 
tactics of direct bureaucratic interference receded.
Stanley argues attacks on media facilities and property involve a transfer in the 
capacity for repression from ‘the state’ to ‘the people’ but media repression, he 
admits, comes from groups who possess a direct relationship with state elites 
(2006: 195). Yet, even during the New Order, much political repression in general 
was subcontracted to groups straddling the political and criminal realms - some of 
it to civilian militia ‘irregulars’ under military patronage. The reformasi era’s much 
more contestable political terrain saw these coercive resources transferred to 
political parties through their paramilitaries and civilian militia (Hadiz 2003: 603).
Failing to make a decisive break with the past, the new era of competitive politics 
reproduced patrimonial ties between elite patrons and politically directed mobs 
with the capacity to convey community outrage against offending targets, 
including the media.  The factionalised military and police were not only key 
subjects of reportage but also key institutions which interacted with the news 
media as it sought access to places of battle and information filtering from those 
places. Local reporters (not from the two Jakarta newspapers) testified to being 
placed in danger when gathering news and became hyper-sensitive to the 
charge from one religious group or the other of taking sides.  This sensitivity was 
formed around a reporter’s religious identity brought on by the war’s contagion 
of suspicion; so conflict conditions served to steer reporters away from firsthand 
accounts that were not ‘official’. 
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 I control my reporters. I say don’t take sources from the grassroots, from 
those at war, that’s not permitted. If you take a source from a warrior, he 
will definitely take the side of his own group. He only sees his own area, not 
other people’s (Pinontoan 2001).
According to media sociologist Gaye Tuchman, choice of sources is part of the 
process of source legitimation; while their comments may be disputed, officials 
are never challenged over their right to make news. This structure, she says, 
theoretically allows the reader to decide who is telling the truth; by structuring the 
alternatives, reporters absolve themselves of responsibility for getting at the truth 
(1978: 92). 
In turn, the highly sensitive nature of partisan accounts pushes reporters into the 
‘safe’ hands of government officials.
To avoid taking sides with one group, we just use the one government 
version. We are then accused of being a mouthpiece for the government 
by the Islamic group. In the conflict area, it’s possible the only neutral 
source is the government one. Because they don’t take the side of one 
group or the other, for us government and security forces are still very 
neutral (Djalil 2001).
The regional press suffered most from the communal pressures applied to all 
media. Religious polarisation in the neighbourhoods of Ambon city led one 
newspaper to split along religious lines. Territorial segregation – a military goal of 
combatants – was mirrored in professional segregation to the point where papers 
identified as ‘Christian’ (due to the make-up of the staff) were denied access to 
territorially-segregated Muslim areas – and vice versa.
But while police and military patrolled the boundaries of these areas and fed 
information to reporters that they could not otherwise establish firsthand, some 
reporters used their networks among the security forces to gain access to sensitive 
locations. A Jakarta-based magazine reporter – herself a Christian – recalls how 
she was able to use her contacts among ‘green’ faction (Islamist) members of TNI 
who brokered interviews with Islamic leaders under military protection (Sidjabat 
2001).
How two influential national newspapers handled these new operating conditions 
in their coverage of communal violence in Maluku is the subject of this paper.
The two news organizations  - Kompas and Republika - respectively originate in 
different religious camps, both born at moments of profound political change, 
and both with their fortunes  - like all Indonesian media businesses - tied to their 
interactions with the state. 
The national newspapers
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In the constricted terrain of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy from 1959, press organs 
tended to be mouthpieces for political parties. The government formalised 
this client-patron structure in early 1965 by passing a regulation requiring that 
every newspaper needed to be officially endorsed by a political party or mass 
organization (including the armed forces) which would be responsible for editorial 
content. (Dhakidae 1991: 55; Hill 1994: 29). 
Thus, the seeds of the Pancasila press during the New Order were sown in the 
preceding Sukarnoist period, a time when political power was consolidated 
through creeping centralism, declining pluralism and the binding of press content 
and market survival to political-military patronage.
Sukarno’s authoritarian turn saw the return of the 1945 constitution, a document 
heavily influenced by the legal philosophy of ‘integralism’. The integralist state 
was less a reflection of society than its embodiment, but not just any society. 
It “mirrored the institutions and ethos of a (highly idealized) traditional village 
community in which there was no sense of separation between rulers and ruled” 
(Bourchier 1997: 162).
The proper role of the state was not simply to regulate society but to 
encompass it, involving itself in all aspects of social life for the sake of the 
well-being of the whole – the whole family as it were (Bourchier 1999: 
186).
Integralism inspired and justified a way of seeing state-society relations which 
fitted the New Order regime perfectly. It acted as a shield against accountability 
and attempts by the press to assume a watchdog role against government 
misdeeds. The media were to be ‘partners’ in national development.
With the wholesale slaughter of leftists following the crushing of the Gestapu 
coup in late 1965, the press system in which leftist parties had been dominant 
was destroyed; the purge of the bureaucracy went hand-in-glove with a purge of 
journalists with only army sponsored newspapers surviving (Dhakidae 1991: 55-
57)
With the emasculation of political parties, the New Order government set about 
implementing its policy of depoliticising society, including the press. But in its 
first ten years, the newspaper market was transformed as much by market and 
technological forces as by the heavy hand of the state.  
With new print technology applied from the late 1960s, progressive companies 
like Kompas-Gramedia flourished, with industry growth tied to national 
development objectives and regulated by state policy. The newspaper business 
was thus transformed from one based on political competition to business 
competition (144). The economic and political climate allowed for generalist 
newspapers like Kompas to extend to “larger depoliticised readerships” cross-
cutting religion, ethnicity and political creeds (149).
The newspaper that went on to become the largest circulation daily in Southeast 
Asia was a child of the Indonesian Catholic Party. Kompas Daily was established in 
a climate of competing influences on the increasingly autocratic Sukarno. Pitted 
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against the (communist) PKI and its network of papers, Kompas’s establishment 
took advantage of the demise of a number of right-wing papers.
On the question of ethnic control and ownership, it was largely Javanese Catholic. 
Its founding editor Jacob Oetama argued the newspaper was committed to 
breaking down ethnic and religious barriers, something reflected in its mixed 
workforce (248).
Kompas was a pioneer of the Indonesian press business and enjoyed rising 
circulation – 100,000 per day by the early 1970s. It was under Oetama’s editorial 
leadership that its forthright, opinionated journalism was tempered in the face of 
“the intensity of the increasing inroads of the state into the world of journalism” 
(253).
However, Kompas’s path-breaking success was still captive to arbitrary state power 
as it discovered in 1978 when following student protests against government 
corruption and the president himself, seven newspapers, including Kompas, 
received temporary bans (313). 
The Kompas-Gramedia Group, according to Hill (1994: 84), showed itself more than 
any other to be prepared to operate within the constraints set by the New Order. 
The conglomerate had interests including book publishing, printing, travel, hotels, 
insurance and advertising. Since the late 1980s, the expansion of its publication 
stable through buyouts and management deals gave it access to a number of 
regional city markets plus a proliferation of specialist publications (85).
It viewed its own success as being able to respond to the changing tastes of an 
emerging middle class as well as a decision to downplay religious affiliation and 
invite gifted Muslim liberals to write for its publications (Hefner 1997: 88). It was 
this Catholic-owned publishing group from the 1970s onward that rode the wave 
of media expansion on the back of a growing urban middle class. By contrast, the 
Islamic daily Harian Abadi – the voice of modernist Islam – had been cut down in 
the bannings of 1974.
It would be 20-odd years before another general publishing licence (SIUPP) was 
granted to a mass-circulation Islamic newspaper. In one sense, the creation of 
Republika newspaper (first published in 1993) was closer to the politicised press 
model that held sway before the rise of press empires in the 1970s and 80s. The 
paper was a venture sponsored by Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia (The 
Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals) or ICMI (pron. Ich-mee).
ICMI – although not a political party – was a significant political force which 
formalized a movement that began in the late 1980s among educated, urban 
Muslims. Its patron was vice-president B.J. Habibie whose own appointment to 
high office reflected the Suharto regime’s accommodation with political Islam. 
This ‘Islamic turn’ was Suharto doing what he did best: balancing the factions 
within the civilian and military bureaucracies to shore up his own power (Liddle 
1996: 630). ICMI was the aspirational voice of middle-class ‘modernist’ Muslims 
and a vehicle used less for the propagation of religious ideology and more to 
vent longstanding grievances and contemporary aspirations. Republika thus 
covered themes for which earlier Islamic press organs had been victimised, such 
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as challenging the crony-capitalist business model favouring ethnic Chinese and 
holding back pribumi (indigenous) businessmen, who are overwhelmingly Muslim 
(Liddle 1996: 618; Bertrand 2004: 86).
While ICMI and Republika had the blessing of the ruling party (Golkar), their 
intellectual pursuits gave rise to a dissident wing, which articulated independent 
views often at odds with Golkar orthodoxy. Of numerous examples of promoting 
a democratic discourse in its pages was Republika’s coverage of the aftermath of 
a raid on the headquarters of Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI) on 27 July 1996 
by elements of the security forces. The attack was aimed at derailing the rising 
popularity of the party and sidelining its leader Megawati Sukarnoputri. The attack 
itself led to protests and riots in support of PDI, which the government blamed 
on activists from the left-wing underground Partai Rakyat Demokrasi (People’s 
Democratic Party) or PRD. 
During the trial of PRD activists, Republika’s sympathetic coverage of the activists 
and scepticism of the government case upset both pro-government stalwarts and 
conservative Islamists, the latter believing their new-found legitimacy within the 
New Order was being imperilled by the Islamic paper’s perceived sympathies and 
youthful cosmopolitanism (Hefner 1997: 97). The paper’s flaunting of doctrinal 
purity and its willingness to promote an open discourse on a plurality of topics, 
according to Hefner, saw them walking a tightrope between “demonstrations of 
respect for the government and maintaining the independence required to win 
readers and demonstrate that Muslims can be principled journalists” (96).
The vibrant public sphere spurred on by media liberalization led to a proliferation 
of journalists’ groups but few unions with industrial strength. In this environment, 
the state paternalism that marked the Pancasila press endured along with family-
style business culture, which obstructed professionalisation (Romano 2003: 170). 
The post-1998 reinvention of New Order personnel within a competitive political 
sphere of parties and parliaments squeezed journalists between the lure of old 
habits and new, unfamiliar challenges to their professionalism, physical safety and 
their employers’ institutional survival. 
Once communal violence in the east became a topic of national coverage, 
newspapers, according to Qodari, found a way to avoid direct reporting of the 
warring parties by sticking to civilian and military official sources:
[M]ilitary and bureaucratic sources are far easier to obtain. Entering 
certain conflict areas endangers journalists.  In religious conflict like 
Maluku, quotations from military sources and bureaucrats are considered 
more neutral since journalists can be shielded from the accusation of 
giving voice to one of the warring groups (Qodari 2000: 6, FN 8).4
The following survey of newspaper texts identifies the news discourses that 
developed in the news pages over key periods during the conduct of the wars. But 
first a methodology is required against which these narratives can be judged. The 
focus is on what narratives emerged and how their meanings can be interpreted 
within the chosen framework. The study does not attempt an ethnographic study 
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of these two news organizations nor their news production processes.
The chosen framework is ‘peace journalism’, a term that gained currency 
following the disintegration of the Yugoslav federation in the early-to-mid 1990s. 
Indonesians even used the term Balkanisasi (Balkanisation) to express their own 
fears that regional violence could lead to a break-up of the Indonesian state. 
In its best known formulation (Lynch 2001; Lynch & McGoldrick 2005; Lynch & 
Galtung 2010), peace journalism counterposes its values with ‘war journalism’. War 
journalism is characterised by a zero-sum approach to conflict: a bi-polar game 
between two parties contesting a single goal where victory followed by ceasefire 
equals peace (Lynch 2001: 16). Its interpretive framework is rigid in the sense that 
it is not designed to offer the audience any insight into the circumstances under 
which violent conflict might remain unresolved and re-surface; peace is simply the 
absence of war.
Similarly, Lynch & Galtung characterise these ‘syndromes of journalism’ in terms 
of ‘violence-victory’ (war journalism) and ‘conflict-solution’ (peace journalism). 
But these orientations are not mutually exclusive (2010: 12). Nor  is the peace-
journalism syndrome a cover for peace advocacy (17). They identify a tendency in 
news discourses to treat violence as the conflict.
[W]ill peace journalism also report violence? Of course. But it will  
report the violence by all sides, and the suffering of all sides, not only  
their violence and our suffering. It will also go deeper, reporting the  
invisible causes and effects of violence without falling into the trap of  
confusing violence and conflict (2010: 12).
War-journalism discourses tend to deal with elite people in elite countries and 
rely heavily on official government sources. This is especially so during military 
action when such tendencies are complicit in government-military efforts to 
keep reporters away from the battlefield, depriving them of primary observation 
and independent sources of information. War journalism employs storytelling 
forms that increasingly align themselves with the strategic logic of warmaking. 
War journalism implicitly recognises that for every victory on the ground, a 
corresponding ‘media war’ must be declared, fought and won.
In regard to cultural conflict, Shinar has questioned the efficacy of the concept 
of resolution when it equates with ‘end-of-conflict’. Such approaches are often 
associated with peace agreements and settlements, which deliver ‘reconciliation’. 
He believes that these approaches are ill-suited to be applied to cultural conflicts, 
marked by intractability, durability, low-intensity, unconventional ‘battlefields’ and 
the use of ‘irregulars’ as fighters (2003: 2-3). 
By adopting the prevailing model of elite peace-making, the news media 
contributes to a ‘crisis of expectations’ when such agreements fail to ‘stick’.5 Shinar 
makes the point that while reconciliation is newsworthy, this media frame is a 
mismatch for the conflict under his study (Israel-Palestine). So, following the 2000 
Intifada (Palestinian uprising) hopes were dashed and the media reverted to 
focusing on the escalating violence rather than the causes of protracted, cultural 
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conflict. This is a useful example of war journalism resulting not simply from a loss 
of faith in reconciliation after being overrun by events, but from an analytic failure 
of the profession. 
The importance of news discourses providing something other than a mirror 
of elite agendas is demonstrated in the case of Maluku where the ‘resolution’ 
was framed in terms of decisive government action. As pressure mounted on 
President Wahid to ‘end’ the conflict, some of his political opponents used the 
communal war to urge escalating military intervention as the preferred solution. 
Wahid resisted this knowing an empowered armed forces - whose powers his 
government was trying to curtail - was as well positioned to 
escalate the fighting as it was to ending it.6
Wars – especially those fought with distinct political goals in mind - are open 
to the manipulations of media diplomacy. Internationalising local struggles 
spotlights not only powerful national and transnational negotiators but sub-
national armed groups. Those intent on ‘making’ the news will always internalise 
media narratives as part of their negotiating arsenal. Lynch describes the 
process thus: “Every time anything is reported, another layer is deposited in the 
collective understanding of the kind of facts likely to be reported in future – an 
understanding which then forms the basis of calculations by newsmakers.” (2001: 
11)
Thus, the alternative framework of interpretation – peace journalism – is 
contingent on an accurate, thorough analysis of the conflict at hand. In the Maluku 
case, this meant understanding volatile centre-periphery politics including 
the context of attempts by former Suharto loyalists to de-stabilise the civilian 
government. To follow this approach, reporters would need to find ways to 
extricate themselves from elite agendas and their mouthpieces and focus on the 
longer-term prospects for inter-communal peace in the region, irrespective of who 
was in power in Jakarta.
A rich body of controversy has both questioned and advanced the idea of peace 
journalism by applying it to different conflict scenarios (Hackett 2006; Hanitzsch 
2007; Kempf 2007; Loyn 2007; Ottosen 2010). Notwithstanding debate over 
whether the peace/war journalism dichotomy is too simplistic, for the purposes of 
this study, it is worth asking how these opposing paradigms can be identified in 
newspaper texts.
‘Primordialist media narratives’ is the preferred term for selecting those discourses 
where ‘war journalism’ is in the ascendancy. It requires some definition.
At its most general, primordialism is simply a strong sense of group identity based 
on some primary form of affiliation: primordial affiliations are “culturally encoded 
systems of meaning with implications for behavior and effect” (Hoben & Hefner 
1991: 18). Primordiality is a permanent social and historical fact in all societies 
that transcends the simplistic duality of tradition and modernity. However, within 
some Western intellectual traditions, it acquired a negative meaning – a kind 
of social affliction where attachment to blood, language, religion and memory 
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made groups violence-prone and indisposed to embracing mature, modern civic 
order (Appadurai 1996: 143). This evolved as a social-scientific explanation for 
a myriad of social ills in postcolonial societies, which were seen as obstacles to 
modernisation.
While discredited in social theory in recent times, the tendency to see allegiance 
to highly personalised institutions which predate modernity 7 as a fundamental 
organising principle of regressive social action persists in modern belief systems. 
A form of cultural determinism, this primordialist thinking has been sustained 
and legitimised within popular culture, not least through media communication. 
It is a function of such primordialist discourses to blur the distinction between 
primordial attachments as a social fact and primordialist (moral and ideological) 
arguments that underpin mobilisational politics, social engineering and violent 
escalation. 
Primordialist discourses, in periods of growing state centralisation, tend to ascribe 
pre-modern attributes to local solidarities, especially when they pose resistance 
to this expansion.  In the Indonesian case, therefore, the lived primordialism of 
regional subjects was repudiated by the developmentalist state and its foreign 
financiers as anti-progress. 
So, ethnic or cultural explanations for group behaviour often imply an unconscious 
primordialism, where actors are portrayed as lacking the calculus of modern 
rational thought. Where such explanations enjoy a common-sense popularity, they 
take on an ideological function, obscuring how symbolic resources are consciously 
instrumentalised by group interests (including state interests) within a dynamic, 
modern political context. Ideological messages depend for their efficacy on such 
symbolic obfuscations.
The post-1965 Indonesian state characterised threats to its authority as ‘internal’ 
to the body politic. Its official defence was to stigmatise primordial identities – 
expressed through the euphemistic acronym SARA8 – as inherently irrational and 
dangerous. Part of the New Order’s ideological strategy, therefore, was to objectify 
local solidarities and declare their symbolic expressions taboo.9 Unreflexive, 
unconscious passions, if allowed to express themselves, the strategy implied, 
could unify groups, explode and run out-of-control.
Appadurai addresses the same question from a different angle. Primordial 
identities are powerful and potentially dangerous because they can be organised 
into culturalist movements.10 These are not unconscious outbreaks of a primordial 
contagion but groups taking cultural difference as their conscious object (1996: 
147). These politicised groups variously may seek recognition, autonomy, survival, 
operate locally or transnationally, but they all employ communicative tactics 
that seek to draw the media onto contestable moral terrain. In this way, media 
narratives become implicated in culturalist agendas and the conveyance of their 
ideological interests. News media especially must keep faith with their audiences 
(or language community) by remaining active and relevant in the public sphere 
but avoid capture by ideological interests whose narratives their audiences are 
likely to reject. 
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In this sense, a primordialist narrative might be a successful media strategy 
for reporting conflict because it resonates with an audience; but it might also 
offer little to explain the processes and events that are the subject of reportage.  
Indeed, a story grounded in a primordialist premise renders historical, contextual 
explanation redundant. Alternatively, reified, ahistorical (primordialist) 
constructions of collective identity might emerge as a preferred reading of events 
where other textual strategies are unsuccessful or untried. It is this falling back on 
a primordialist reading – in the absence of other textual strategies – that prevails 
in the news reportage of both Indonesian newspapers under study.  In either 
case, media narratives will tend to naturalise primordialist readings of the physical 
and ideological dimensions of violent conflict, as the following textual analysis 
demonstrates.
The data surveyed comes from clusters of news reportage chosen to coincide 
with significant events and developments spanning an 11-month period from the 
second major outbreak of riots in Ambon in late July 1999 to the declaration of a 
state of emergency across the Maluku provinces in late June 2000.11 Within these 
clusters, 79 articles were surveyed – 43 in Republika and 36 in Kompas. 
What follows is a quantitative tally of descriptors for combatants broken down into 
‘generic’, where the basis of group affiliation is not revealed as in dua kelompok 
yang bertikai (the two warring groups) and ‘non-generic’, where group affiliation is 
explicit in the naming of combatants as in massa Kristen (the Christian mob). These 
naming conventions emerge either in a nominal form (e.g. two warring groups) 
or adjectivally, describing a conflict (e.g. the inter-communal fighting). Both types 
are recorded in these categories. Phrases such as tokoh masyarakat (community 
leader), tokoh beragama (religious leader) and references to agents provocateurs 
(provokator, oknum) are not counted unless it is clear they are directly involved in 
the fighting. 
Table 1
GENERIC & NON-GENERIC DESCRIPTORS FOR COMBATANTS
July 1999 – June 2000 (selected periods)
Daily  #articles  generic  non-generic
Republika 43  57 [59%] 39 [41%]
Kompas  36  53 [81%] 12 [19%]
Table 2
GENERIC & NON-GENERIC DESCRIPTORS FOR COMBATANTS
26th December 1999 – 8th January 2000
Daily  #articles  generic  non-generic
Republika 22  26 [45%] 31 [55%]    
Kompas  18  29 [72%] 11 [28%]  
Framing religious conflict
Issue No.21, December 2011 13
Asia Pacific Media Educator
Clearly, the degree to which Kompas seeks to avoid descriptions that reveal a 
religious basis to hostility and war is very high and greater than Republika’s.12 
However, the contrast between Kompas’s caution and Republika’s privileging of 
Islamic viewpoints (enabled by greater use of non-generic language) in some 
respects is overdrawn. What the two Indonesian researchers (Qodari & Eriyanto) do 
identify are changes between the early stages of the war in the north (Oct – Nov 
1999) and the period of its escalation after Christmas in the same year. Not only 
do the number of news reports increase in the second period, but also Republika’s 
coverage becomes more ‘fierce’ (galak) in style and content as the number of 
Muslim victims explodes (9). This is reflected in my own results for a similar period 
in Table 2.13 The sharp rise in Muslim deaths in the post-Christmas period coincides 
with an increase (14%) in Republika reporters’ propensity to describe victims as 
‘Muslims’ and their attackers as ‘Christians’. 
But more telling is the picture that emerges from Table 1, derived from data over 
the full sample period14 and encompassing reportage from north and south. In 
the 11-month sample, while not as pronounced as Kompas (81%), Republika’s 
preference for euphemism and sanitised language when describing combatants 
is significantly high (59%). Despite the different orientations of these papers, the 
challenge of reporting civil war produces continuities as well as divergence in 
reporting styles and professional outcomes. This is reinforced by the following 
comparative treatment of sourcing.
Table 3
OFFICIAL STATE VERSUS PARTISAN SOURCES
July 1999 – June 2000 (selected periods)
Daily  #articles  official  partisan
Republika 43  65 [48%] 72 [52%]  
Kompas  36  93 [87%] 14 [13%]   
   
Table 4
MALUKAN AND NON-MALUKAN SOURCES
July 1999 – June 2000 (selected periods)
Daily  #articles  Malukan non-Malukan
Republika 43  69 [43%] 93 [57%]   
Kompas  36  40 [32%] 86 [68%]
The most obvious result from Table 3 is Kompas’s hyper-dependence on official-
state sources, both civilian and military. Republika displays a much more even 
distribution between official and partisan sources. However, sourcing preferences 
converge when both papers show a preponderance of sources from outside the 
conflict zone (Table 4).15 Kompas’s official source dependency is exacerbated by 
its superior score for non-Malukan sources, producing Jakarta-centric, official 
14 Issue No.20, December 2010
discourses where storytelling from the conflict zone is muted, often inaudible. 
Republika’s apparent lesser dependence on officialdom is offset by a number of 
factors: first, its partisan sources are overwhelmingly Islamic and second, out of 
those partisan sources, a clear majority (61%) speak from outside the war zone 
(that is, Jakarta). This suggests an official-source dependency exists – though 
one less slavish than Kompas – with a tendency to be a reliable outlet for Islamic 
political agendas organised from Jakarta.
Kompas did not so much avoid Christian sources but partisan, self-consciously 
Christian ones. Conversely, while all its partisan voices were kept to an absolute 
minimum (13%), when partisan Muslim spokespeople did speak, they did so 
stridently and without balancing comment. 
The textual suppression of the identity of combatants undermined professional 
obligations to explain the bases of hostility. This privileged primordialist readings 
of the apparently endless outbreaks of violence across time and space. The 
censorious instincts of editors, one theory suggests (Eriyanto 2000), are employed 
to dampen conflict, avoid aggravating partisan anger and enlarging hostility 
not just in the battle zones but also throughout the general population. While 
verifying whether this approach can achieve such goals may be untestable, it 
raises deeper questions of professional purpose: which aspects of journalistic 
narrative can be legitimately tampered with to achieve these avowedly 
higher goals; by what criteria do editors mandate the selective removal of 
narrative elements for this purpose; and in a related sense, what commercial 
and professional considerations apply in editorial decisions that deem certain 
information needs of readers (e.g. knowing who is attacking whom) to be 
expendable? Such decisions also have implications for who is telling the story 
since such self-censoring often involves ceding narrative control to certain classes 
of story-tellers (e.g. official sources). 
If the dividend from oblique naming techniques is a non-confrontational storyline, 
the deficit is narrative clarity. It might be said that terms like ‘inter-communal’ in 
the context of news on Maluku would be recognisable by readers as an oblique 
reference to religious-based communal conflict; but in practice, this reporting style 
more often than not muddies rather than clarifies the factual situation. 
These issues come up earlier in Kompas’s coverage of trans-regional conflict 
occurring simultaneously in Ambon and North Maluku. On 31st December 1999, 
first mention of the post-Christmas mass killings of Muslims in Halmahera are 
made in the form of a casualty estimate; but Kompas reporters make no mention 
of who is killing whom, only that clashes were ‘between groups of different 
religions’.16 The ‘tragedy’ in Tobelo, the report suggests, is somehow related to 
a ‘big riot’ in Ambon just prior to it, but no light is shed on this connection so 
it remains speculative; in the lead paragraph Ambon clashes are described as 
‘spreading’ to outlying areas, including North Maluku, overlooking the local history 
of the latter conflict. When details later emerge that these clashes were in fact one-
sided massacres (pembantaian) of Muslims, Kompas’s habitual use of ‘safe’ terms 
like bentrokan (clashes) is exposed. So too is its ability to make sense of ensuing 
Muslim outrage and its mobilisational spin-offs compromised.17
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Similarly, editorial preferences to tell the Maluku story through official-state 
and Islamic political discourses centred in Jakarta left little room for accounts 
of the ground war in Maluku. When the civil emergency is put in place in June 
2000, there is a rare and brief mention of ‘red and white troops’. It is revealing of 
Kompas’s studious detachment from the conduct of the war that these troops’ 
Panglima Perang (war commanders) – 17 months after the start of the conflict – 
remain unnamed. In fact, both papers have little to report on the commanders’ 
leadership structures, recruitment, military tactics or strategic thinking.18 
No doubt official-source dependency and detachment from the ground war – in 
the Maluku case as elsewhere – are functions of the lack of access to the war zone 
and its direct participants. However, it is questionable – at least from this textual 
analysis – whether either paper sought to get close to the battlefields in order 
to allow local dynamics and insights to drive their conflict narratives. Even when 
stories moved away from the rancour of Jakarta politicians or the minimalist 
expressions of military spokesmen, descriptive accounts of physical destruction 
and verifying the number of dead and wounded were almost always preferred to 
explanations of violent phenomena in their local setting. On the rare occasions 
when reporting space was given to analysis, commentators opined from Jakarta, 
not from the heart of the action.
 
If the advantages of official-source dependency include easy access to officials, 
the downside is that it hampers the development of consistent storylines and the 
ability to pursue them through to independent conclusions. Nowhere is this more 
apparent in the survey sample than in coverage of the role of state security forces 
(SSF). A persistent question thrown up throughout the 79 news articles is: ‘are the 
security forces part of the solution or part of the problem?’ This complex theme 
infiltrates a broad array of conflict events in the archipelago and efforts at all levels 
of the political centre to restore order to its fracturing eastern periphery. 
The ambiguous and sometimes renegade role played by SSF presents itself 
throughout the texts under study; but these in the main consist of passing 
references rather than systematic inquiry. Consequently, one of the key political 
and strategic issues behind Maluku’s communal wars receives a fragmentary 
treatment in news discourse. Partisan security personnel (whether TNI or police) 
are generally referred to as oknum (rogue elements); sometimes the term 
provokator is used indirectly but never explicitly to describe aparat (security 
personnel). Such SSF behaviour is usually described as memihak (taking sides) but 
the basis of partisanship (for example, religious identity) is rarely spelt out.
At times, the inability of SSF to restrain hostile groups is highlighted,19 while at 
others, the practice of shooting into warring mobs with resulting casualties is 
mentioned in dispatches.20  The military’s reassurance to politicians and the public 
that 15 battalions had been deployed to the province21 is contrasted with reports 
of villagers rejecting TNI protection and forming their own security posts.22
Security personnel and their media masks 
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The SSF’s apparent tactic of discharging their weapons to disperse or separate 
warring parties sometimes becomes confused when locals are reported accusing 
‘rogue security personnel of taking sides with certain groups’ (oknum aparat 
memihak kelompok tertentu). This presents openings for narrative inquiry but 
in one case, it is not until the final paragraph we are presented with a powerful 
image around which a single storyline might have been built: 
The security forces - both TNI and police - appeared to be having 
increasing difficulty dispersing the attackers who were equipped 
with weaponry almost the same as possessed by the security forces 
themselves.23
When, occasionally, the primary news angle involves ‘oknum aparat’, there is no 
independent information to compare with the SSF accounts. We read only that 
TNI or police suspects are being investigated, for example, for the shooting of 21 
victims in an Ambon village: a TNI commander suggests his suspect personnel 
were provoked by the sniper killing of a colleague.24 Even more intriguing is an 
unsourced report accusing a police lieutenant-colonel of orchestrating riots 
clandestinely, whose case is being handled by TNI.25 Another report has agent 
provocateurs acting on behalf of ‘national political constellations’ posing in SSF 
uniform with false rank.26 When a report of a seminar airs serious allegations of SSF 
institutional corruption (rather than the errant behaviour of individual ‘oknum’), 
the TNI response is to demand proof: “logically, it does not enter our minds to 
engineer riots”.27 This important theme is not interrogated in subsequent editions 
of either paper within the survey sample.
There are very limited references linking rogue behaviour to the religious faith of 
SSF members. Nor in the sample is there any analysis of the ethno-religious make-
up of SFF units, their geographic origins or the timing of particular deployments 
in relation to the conduct of the war. This is in keeping with the minimalist 
approach to reporting the religious affiliation of combatants. Occasionally, when 
the link is made, they remain uninterrogated, such as ‘oknum Brimob Kristen’ 
(rogue Christian riot police)28 or ‘tembak di antara aparat TNI yang berbeda agama’ 
(shooting between TNI personnel of different religions).29 
Precise connections between SSF, the complicity of ‘rogue elements’ in criminal 
activity and the religious-communal partisanship of such elements are subject to 
deepening confusion in reportage of a major security debacle in Ambon just prior 
to the state of emergency in June 2000. Following clashes described vaguely as 
having elements of SARA30, the riot police’s armoury at Tantui is ransacked by ‘a 
mob’ and their living quarters burnt to the ground with SSF fleeing the mayhem. A 
police spokesman admits the possibility of rogue elements of TNI/national police 
being involved. Amidst the growing rancour of calls from Jakarta’s political circles 
to end the conflict, a journalistic disentangling of so demoralising an event could 
have helped to reveal what the central government and its disorderly security 
apparatus were truly facing in restoring peace in the periphery. Instead, readers 
suffer endless repeats of military officials pledging ‘firm action’, ‘upholding of the 
law’ and ‘arrests of provocateurs’. Meanwhile, an embattled president issues tough 
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but impotent warnings to unnamed ‘big shots’: “Your actions have gone too far. 
If we run out of patience, look out! There are limits…Those who have high rank, 
large wealth will be run over by the people.”31 
In summary, for large parts of the sample period both daily newspapers under 
study fell back on ‘safe’ integralist principles when reporting the progress of the 
protracted Maluku wars. Both sets of reportage were content to cede intellectual 
initiative to established state information sources, preferring civilian and military 
officials to mediate between communal strife and their reporters. This approach 
underpinned narratives, which lacked continuity over time, suppressed the 
identity of combatants (and their authentic voices) and left unexplored their 
complex relationship to their enemies, including themes unrelated to religion. 
As a direct consequence of this narrative distance, the news pages were filled 
with ‘talking heads’ expressing Jakarta-centric political manoeuvres and agendas, 
stressing partisan political feuding outside the Malukan battle zones. Malukan 
cross-communal solutions and peace initiatives were all but invisible in the news 
pages of both papers.
Undercontextualised facts and opinion underpinning this style of ‘talking 
journalism’ (jurnalisme omongan) were preferred to narrative inquiry building 
towards transparent conclusions.
Changes in the balance-of-forces on the northern front of the battleground did 
not prompt reporters to re-capture narrative initiative from official sources but 
rather amplified the disadvantages of distance from the battlefield. Nor did it 
shift focus from Jakarta official discourses to ones inside Maluku’s combat zones. 
Instead, an intensification of the war in the north (including atrocities against 
Muslims villagers after Christmas 1999) led to an enhanced media focus on 
Jakarta-based agendas, but now involving paramilitary mobilisation. Both papers 
eschewed narrative complexity in favour of reproducing (mostly uncritically) the 
simplistic war rhetoric of paramilitary leaders and their (sometimes unwitting) 
ideological supporters. Republika used its reports to encourage its readers 
to identify as vicarious victims of (unexplained) ‘Christian aggression’ in an 
outer province. The call for jihad from Jakarta allowed it to affirm its nationalist 
credentials by giving voice to resurgent elements of Islamic nationalism. Neither 
daily seized the chance to interrogate the national implications of a deployment of 
fighters to an already war-ravaged region of the republic.
Primary vehicles for agendas at the political centre – official state sources and 
state-aligned Islamic political contenders – secured largely unfiltered access to 
the news pages and were thus able to present their own crafted spin on Maluku 
violence that harmonised with their own political strategies. This cancelled out 
independent framing based on narrative continuity by offering vested interests 
wedded to prolongation of the war direct lines of access to national audiences.
Both papers promoted primordialist perspectives of violent conflict by offering no 
consistent alternative readings in their news discourses. But each paper did so by 
Conclusion
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way of different discursive methods. Kompas’s official-source hyper-dependency 
soaked up drip-fed statements from the security forces to produce a minimalist, 
context-less and truncated presentation of separate ‘eruptions’ breaking out 
around the archipelago. Undernourished by a lack of strong narrative threads and 
denied the chance to engage with the realities of distant violence, Kompas readers 
were left to ponder each eruption as unexplainable, and therefore as confirmation 
of irreconcilable religious differences. 
Unsurprisingly, after minimising religious-communal oppositions in deference 
to entrenched reporting taboos inculcated during the previous era, both papers 
were found wanting when these questions pulled rapidly into focus in 1999 and 
sharpened at the beginning of 2000. Consequently, the reportage of both papers 
was tightly anchored to the vicissitudes of elite politics at the centre and cut adrift 
from the extreme suffering in a politically marginal province, whose crisis was 
alleged to have so preoccupied Jakarta’s powerbrokers.
What neither paper attempted was to disaggregate the complex entanglement of 
interests and players working between the centre and periphery and between the 
combat and non-combat spheres. The fragmentation of security forces was only 
going to be intelligible if it was informed by the long and bloody history of civilian 
militia forces (some formed along religious lines), created and commanded by, and 
cooperating with Indonesian army and police. But instead, both papers – either 
actively or by default – became vehicles for mining a far simpler and accessible 
corner of national historical memory – base religious primordialism. 
Religious enmity was presented as natural, inevitable and without end and so 
lacked explanatory power. By privileging this aspect of religious experience in the 
news text, their stories could not begin to decipher the interactions of rogues, 
warriors and Jakarta-based war beneficiaries that prolonged the war. 
In its place, the Maluku maelstrom was portrayed both actively and unwittingly 
as a war-without-end, above the manipulations of political agency. The media’s 
failure to address shifting power relations between political elites in Jakarta 
and Maluku was a spectacular failure of journalism that did nothing to assist a 
negotiated peace and may have contributed to the war’s significant escalation. 
Unwittingly or not, both newspapers analysed in this study produced storylines 
that reinforced the rhetorical logic of warmaking. 
1  See Neumann (2000: 15).
2   The plural is used to denote war erupting in different geographical zones within 
different time frames; there is a general distinction between a war in the south 
(Ambon Island) and in the north (mainly Ternate & Halmahera) but fighting was 
also prevalent in areas away from these centres. See van Klinken (2001).
3  In August 2001, the largest daily newspaper in Aceh, Serambi Indonesia was 
threatened by a separatist group with having its premises burnt down and its 
workers killed and as a result, suspended publication (Mater, G. ‘Indonesia’s 
free press not a trouble-free press, correspondents say’ <freedomforum.org> 
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19th August 2001). See also ‘Attacks against journalists continue’, AJI/IFEX press 
release, 13th March 2000.
4  Qodari’s study covers news of the North Maluku conflict during the period 
25th October to 15 November 1999 and apart from Republika and Kompas also 
includes Suara Pembaruan, a Protestant affiliated national daily. 
5  On this theme, see Wolfsfeld in Irvan (2006: 36).
6  Parliamentarians such as the PPP’s Hamzah Haz were calling for a military 
emergency to be imposed in North Maluku from early 2000. See, for example, 
‘Abu Lahab dan Abu Jahal Ambon akan Kita Gulung Bersama’ (Ambon’s Abu 
Lahab and Abu Jahal will bring us together), Republika, 8th January 2000 
and ‘Umat Islam Desak Gus Dur Segera Selesaikan Masalah Ambon’ (Islamic 
community asks Gus Dur to immediately resolve the Ambon problem), 
Republika, 10th January 2000. Even when a civil emergency was introduced 
across the entire Maluku region in late June 2000, a full military emergency was 
still an option, according to the coordinating minister for political & security 
affairs; see ‘Gubernur Maluku berlakukan Jam Malam Maluku’ (Governor brings 
in Maluku curfew), Republika, 28th June 2000.
7  For various case studies from Western and non-Western societies, see West & 
Sanders (2003a).
8  Acronym stands for suku (ethnic), agama (religious), ras (racial), antar 
golongan (inter-group); the latter itself was a euphemism for ‘class’. The term 
enabled government officials and citizens alike to speak in oblique terms about 
cultural conflict, as in konflik SARA (SARA conflict) without shedding light on its 
nature and context. This served government policy by suppressing its political 
dimensions.
9  This was especially so when such expressions were politically salient; timeless, 
authentic, ‘folk’ traditions under official supervision, however, were promoted 
or even mandated in their Indonesianised form. See Schrauwers (1998: 204) 
and Budianta (2000: 116).
10  Appadurai uses ‘culturalist’ in a manner analogous to ‘primordialist’; this 
adjectival form connotes the ideologising of identity in the sense inferred by 
Eisenstadt (1996: 31-34).
11  Survey periods are identical for each newspaper: 25th – 31st July 1999 (the 
week immediately following a major outbreak in Ambon – the so-called 2nd 
riot); 21st  – 25th  August 1999 (the period immediately following the first major 
outbreak on Halmahera, North Maluku at Malifut); 26th Dec 1999 – 8th Jan 
2000* (coinciding with major and sustained outbreaks in Ambon on 26th Dec, 
on Halmahera on 27th and easily the most lethal period of the war; includes 
the key gathering in Jakarta at Monas on the 7th Jan); 7th – 8th April 2000 
(includes reportage on a major meeting and demonstration in front of the 
presidential palace by Laskar Jihad paramilitaries); 24th – 30th May 2000 (period 
when Laskar Jihad troops were first present in Maluku); 24th – 30th June 2000 
(period immediately following a major attack on police armoury in Ambon and 
includes declaration of state of civil emergency on 27th).  * For Kompas, this 
period was extended to 10th January 2000 as there was no edition on the 8th.
12  This is broadly consistent with the results of news content analyses by Qodari 
(2000) and Eriyanto (2000) who examine the North Maluku conflict in two 
different periods. They found that generally Republika represented North 
Maluku as a religious conflict and openly judged the opposing sides; whereas 
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Kompas adopted a ‘safe’ position and avoided passing judgment on either side 
(Qodari 2000: 8-9).
13  This period of intensified violence in the north roughly coincides with 
Eriyanto’s sample period which covers 26 Dec 1999 – 15 Jan 2000, though his 
analysis applies only to reporting on North Maluku.
14  That is, my selected dates over the full 11-month sample period.
15  Stark biases towards non-Malukan Islamic sources were found for both papers 
in Sudibyo’s research which surveyed the period 7th – 15th January 2000 (2000: 
28).
16  Victims are described as ‘people from Tobelo’ (warga Tobelo, not warga Muslim 
Tobelo) and their attackers ‘the other group/the disturbing group’ (warga 
kelompok lain/kelompok pengganggu, not Christian attackers); attacks in 
Galela are referred to as kerusuhan/pertikaian (rioting/fighting) without 
naming the sides; only by naming the settlements that were attacked and the 
ones which were the subject of reprisal attacks might the reader be able to 
identify who is attacking whom. See ‘Sekitar 265 Orang Tewas di Maluku Utara’ 
(Around 265 people killed in North Maluku), Kompas 31st December 1999: 1.
17  Senior editorial & research manager at Kompas, Daniel Dhakidae, 
acknowledges that his paper was “not too successful” in explaining the Maluku 
conflict to its readers but attributes this to “ideological obstacles” rather than 
any skill deficiencies (Dhakidae 2001).
18  See ‘Kontrol Tetap Diperlukan’ (Control still needed), Kompas, 29th June 2000: 1 
& 11.
19  For example, see ‘Takkan Ada Keadaan Darurat’ (There will not be any state of 
emergency), Kompas,  30th December 1999: 1.  
20  See ‘ Kerusuhan Ambon Meluas, 11 Tewas’ (Ambon rioting widens, 11 killed), 
Republika, 28th July 1999: 1; and ‘Orang Luar Dilarang Datang ke Maluku’ 
(Outsiders banned from entering Maluku), Kompas, 24th June 2000: 1
21  ‘15 Batalyon Ditugaskan ke Wilayah Maluku’ (15 battalions deployed to Maluku 
area), Kompas, 12th January 2000: 3.
22  ‘Korban Tewas dalam Lima Hari 453 Orang’ (Victims killed in 5 days: 453), 
Republika, 31st December 1999: 1.
23  ‘TNI akan Bertindak Lebih Tegas’ (TNI will take firmer action), Kompas, 25th June 
2000: 11.
24  ‘4 Anggota TNI Jadi Tersangka Kasus Penembakan di Galala’ (TNI members 
become suspects in shooting incident in Galala), Kompas, 19th August 1999: 17.
25  ‘Diselidiki, Aktor di Balik Pertikaian di Ambon’ (Investigated, actor behind 
fighting in Ambon), Kompas, 23rd August 1999: 11.
26  ‘Pemda Minta Pusat Atasi Kemelut Ambon’ (Provincial government asks the 
centre to overcome the Ambon disaster), Kompas, 16th August 1999: 12.
27  ‘Penilitian PSPK Indikasikan TNI Terlibat dalam Kerusuhan Ambon’ (PSPK 
research indicates TNI involved in Ambon riots), Republika, 27th May 2000: 2.
28  ‘Tobelo and Galela Jadi Ladang Pembantaian Kaum Muslim’ (Tobelo and Galela 
become killing field for Muslims), Republika, 5th January 2000: 13.
29  ‘Menneg HAM Akui Pemerintah Kurang Koordinasi Soal Maluku’ (Minister for 
Human Rights admits lacks of coordination on Maluku problem), Kompas, 7th 
January 2000: 11
30  A New Order acronym for suku (ethnic), agama (religious), ras (racial) and 
antar-golongan (inter-group) conflict designated by New Order ideologues 
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as ‘off-limits’ for journalistic reporting. Official generalities like ‘security 
disturbance’ were repeated in news discourses to avoid acknowledging group 
difference (ethnic, religious) as a basis for protest and mobilisation. ‘Konflik 
SARA’ became a catch-all term to allude to but ultimately suppress solidarities 
based on cultural identity. In their place, national identity (and allegiance to the 
state) was promoted systematically as the supreme form of collective identity 
and belonging within Indonesia’s Pancasila democracy. See Antlov (2000).
31  ‘Orang Luar Dilarang Datang ke Maluku’ (Outsiders banned from entering 
Maluku), Kompas, 24th June 2000: 1.
Adam, A. B. (1995), The vernacular press and the emergence of modern Indonesian 
consciousness 1855-1913, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, Ithaca
Antlov, H. (2000), ‘Demokrasi Pancasila and the future of ideology in Indonesia’ in Antlov, H. 
& Ngo, T-W. (eds), The Cultural Construction of Politics in Asia, Curzon Press, London: 203-
222
Appadurai, A. (1996), Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization, University of 
Minnesota Press Minneapolis
Bertrand, J. (2004), Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia, Cambridge University 
Press, London
Bourchier, D. (1997), ‘Totalitarianism and the National Personality: Recent Controversy 
about the Philosophical Basis of the Indonesian State’ in Schiller, J. & Martin-Schiller, B. 
(eds), Imagining Indonesia: cultural politics and political culture, Ohio University Center for 
International Studies, Athens: 157-185
Budianta, M. (2000), ‘Discourse of cultural identity in Indonesia during the 1997-1998 
monetary crisis’, Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, Vol 1, 1: 109-128
Dhakidae, D. (1991), ‘The State, the Rise of Capital and the Fall of Political Journalism: 
Political economy of Indonesian news industry’, doctoral dissertation, Cornell University, 
Ithaca
Dhakidae, D. (2001), Kompas newspaper, interview, 3rd May, Jakarta
Djalil, R. (2001), Ternate Pos newspaper, interview, 10th March, Jakarta
Eriyanto (2000), ‘Kompas dan Suara Pembaruan Minus Konflik SARA’, Pantau, 9: 13-25
Gazali, E. (2002), ‘The Suharto Regime and its Fall through the Eyes of the Local Media’, 
Gazette, Vol 64, 2: 121-140
Hackett, R. A. (2006), ‘Is Peace Journalism Possible? Three Frameworks for Assessing 
Structure and Agency in News Media’, conflict & communication online, Vol 5, 2
http://www.cco.regener-online.de/
Hadiz, V.R. (2003), ‘Reorganising political power in Indonesia: a reconsideration of so-called 
‘democratic transitions’’, Pacific Review, Vol 16, 4: 591-611
Hanitzsch, T. (2007), ‘Situating Peace Journalism in Journalism Studies: A critical appraisal’, 
conflict & communication online, Vol 6, 2
http://www.cco.regener-online.de/
References
22 Issue No.21, December 2011
Framing religious conflict
Hefner, R. W. (1997), ‘Print Islam: Mass Media and Ideological Rivalries among Indonesian 
Muslims’, Indonesia, 64, October: 77-103
Hill, D. T. (1994), The Press in New Order Indonesia, University of Western Australia Press, 
Nedlands
Hoben, A. & Hefner, R. (1991), ‘The Integrative Revolution Revisited’, World Development, Vol 
19, 1: 17-30
Irvan, S. (2006), ‘Peace Journalism as a Normative Theory: Premises and Obstacles’, Global 
Media Journal, Vol 1, 2: 34-39
Kempf, W. (2007), ‘A tightrope walk between advocacy journalism and constructive conflict 
coverage’, conflict & communication on line Vol.6:2, http:www.cco.regener.online.de/
Liddle, R. W. (1996), ‘The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation’, The Journal of 
Asian Studies, Vol 55, 3: 613-634
Lindsey, T. (2001), ‘The Criminal State: Premanisme and the New Indonesia’ in Lloyd, G. & 
Smith S. (eds), Indonesia today: challenges of history, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
Singapore
Klinken, G. van (2001) ‘The Maluku Wars: Bringing society back in’, Indonesia 71 April: 1-26
Loyn, D. (2007), ‘Good Journalism or peace journalism?’ conflict & communication online, Vol 
6, 2  http://www.cco.regener-online.de/
Lynch, J. (2001): Reporting the World www.reportingtheworld.org 
Lynch, J. & McGoldrick, A. (2005), Peace journalism, Stroud, Hawthorn
Lynch, J. & Galtung, J. (2010), Reporting Conflict: new directions in peace journalism, 
University of Queensland Press, St Lucia
Neumann, A. L. (2000), ‘Press, Power & Politics: Indonesia 2000’, A Freedom Forum report on 
the Indonesian media,
http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documentID=14617
Ottosen, R. (2010), ‘The war in Afghanistan and peace journalism in practice’, Media, War & 
Conflict, Vol 3. 3: 261-278
Pinontoan, N. (2001), Suara Maluku, interview, 4th March, Jakarta 
Qodari, M. (2000), ‘Minum Pemberitaan versi Kristen’, Pantau, 9: 3-12
Qodari, M. & Eriyanto (2000), ‘Mempertimbangkan Jurnalisme Perdamaian’, Pantau, 9: 41-48
Schrauwers, A. (1998), ‘Returning to the origin: Church and State in the Ethnographies of 
the To Pamona’ in Kahn, J. S. (ed), Southeast Asian Identities: culture and the politics of 
representation in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies Singapore: 203-226
Seaton, J. (2005), Carnage and the media: the making and breaking of news about violence, 
Allen Lane, London  
Shinar, D. (2003), ‘The peace process in cultural conflict: The role of the media’, conflict & 
communication online, Vol 2, 1: 1-10
Issue No.21, December 2011 23
Asia Pacific Media Educator
Sidjabat, V. (2001), Forum Keadilan, interview, 14th April, Jakarta
Stanley, (2006), ‘The media as a control and as a spur for acts of violence’ in Coppel, C.A. (ed), 
Violent conflicts in Indonesia: analysis, representation, resolution, Routledge, N.Y.: 195-205
Tuchman, G. (1978), Making news: a study in the construction of reality, Free Press New York 
West, H. G. & Sanders, T. (eds)(2003a), Transparency and conspiracy: ethnographies of 
suspicion in the new world order, Duke University Press, Durham
STEVE SHARP, PhD, This paper is an abridged version of chapter six of 
his doctoral thesis from Griffith University, Gold Coast Queensland – 
titled ‘From Primordialism to Peace Journalism: Lessons from reporting 
transitional violence in Indonesia from the late New Order to early 
Reformasi’. It will be published in early 2012 by Routledge UK as part 
of its Contemporary Southeast Asia Series under the title: ‘Journalism 
and Conflict in Indonesia: From Reporting Violence to Promoting Peace’. 
Steve currently teaches multimedia journalism at James Cook University, 
Queensland, Australia. He also owns and edits telingamedia.com, a 
multimedia website covering the history, politics, arts and culture of the 
southwest Pacific. 
